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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
EUGENE WILLIAMS, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
LON ROTHEY, et al, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from the ruling of the Trial Court 
rlPnYing plaintiff's motion to amend the pleadings to 
conform to the facts. This appeal is based upon the 
following grounds : 
Point 1. The evidence warranted a finding that the 
defendants were guilty of wilful and wanton negligence 
in maintaining a dangerous condition on their premises. 
Point 2. The amendment was timely because the 
Motion to Amend was pennitted by the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. 
Point 3. The amendment vrns merely an addition to 
a cause set forth in the pre-trial order. 
STATEMENT OF, THE FACTS 
rrhe plaintiff, a 36-year-old man, married with six 
children ('rr. 56) was employed on April 4, 1963, as a 
driver salesman for the Ogden Distributing Company. 
(Tr. 56) On that date, plaintiff was ordered to deliver 
beer to the defendants' premises to be used by the Junior 
Chamber of Commerce at their election meeting (Tr. 57i. 
'J1his he did about 5 :30 p.m. (Tr. 57). Subsequ1·ntl~-, at 
about 9 :00 p.m., he returned to see if the equipmert wa~ 
working satisfactorily (Tr. 58). He couldn't use thi· 
regular entrance by reason of the crowd and asked an 
employee of the defendants if there was another entrance 
(Tr. 60). He was directed to a passageway and advised 
that there might be a trap door (Tr. 60). He procef'ded 
down the passageway safely-he had to stop and move 
a piece of plywood-(Tr. 140). He proceeded to tht 
area of the meeting, adjusted the keg and started back 
down the hall (Tr. 61). When he came to the piece of 
plywood he again moved it, took a step and fell into 
an unlighted, unguarded hole into the basement (Tr. 61). 
The Treasurer of the Junior Chamber of Com-
merce (Tr. 81) testified that he frequently used that 
possageway (Tr. 32). That he had never seen a trap 
door-did not know of its existence prior to the incident 
in question (Tr. 35). He had never seen any signs (Tr. 
36-47) or lights (Tr. 37-46). He stated it was like a tun-
nel. (Tr. 37) although he had observed a piece of plywood 
in the passageway prior theretofore (Tr .. 48.). This was 
confirmed by another Ogden businessman (Tr. 53, 54, 
55). 
The defendants conceded that the plywood was 
loose-it was not hinged nor could it be locked (Tr. 22~ 
23), although subsequent to this event he installed both 
hinges and locks (Tr. 22). 
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Tlw defendants and their employees knew that pa-
t rrn1~ an<l guests used the passageway for their own 
Jllll']HJses (Tr. 26, 146, 147, 189) and this was not unusual 
(Tr. 190) 
rrhe employee of the defendants, who was in charge 
of the premises at the time, stated that after the plaintiff 
had gone through she replaced the plywood (Tr. 140). 
Thereafter someone opened the trap door (Tr. 142) and 
1d1Pn open it created a dangerous condition (Tr. 140. 
143, 147). 
There was no contention that the opening was 
lighted, either above or below, or that there were any 
~uard rails or other safety devices to permit a person 
to see the hole or to protect them from falling therein. 
The plaintiff moved to amend the pleadings and 
pn•-trial order by alleging wilful and wanton negligence 
at the conclusion of plaintiff's case (Tr. 177); the plain 
tiff again moved to amend at the conclusion of the 
dPfendants' case (Tr. 202); the plaintiff submitted in-
structions in line with his theory (plaintiff's proposed 
f nst!:uctions 4,5, and 6); and plaintiff moved for a new 
trial because the Court refused to permit the amend-
ments and plaintiff's requested instructions-all were 
denied by the Court. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE EVIDENCE WARRANTED A ~-,IND­
IN"G THAT THE DEFENDANTS vVERE 
GUILTY OF WILFUL AND vYANTON NEG-
3 
LIGENCE IN MAlN'l1Al~ING A DAKCEH-
OUS CONDITION ON THEIR PREillISES. 
The jury could have found that the plainti:'.'f fp]] 
down an unguarded trap door opening, situated i;1 r:n 
unlit passageway, hidden further by a piece of plywood. 
They could also have found that he could see no si[Il, 
tl c 
or \v'arning devices and that he, having traversed th" 
pasageway safely minutes before, had no reason to su~ 
pect the existence of such a danger. 
These facts so found would justify the jury in find-
that a dangerous condition existed that constituted a 
nuisance and that the defendants were guilty of wilful 
and wanton negligence or misconduct. 
Section 500 - Restatement of the Law of Torts (2) 
provides: 
The actor's conduct is in reckless disregard uf 
the safety of another if he does an act or inten-
tionally fails to do an act which it is his duty to 
the other to do, knowing or having reason to bow 
of facts which would lead a reasonable man to 
realize, not only that his conduct creates an un-
reasonable risk of physical harm to another bnt 
also that such risk is substantially greater than 
that which is necessary to make his conduct negli-
gent. 
the comments thereunder, recognize that there must 
be an awareness of the risk-but surely this knowledge 
of the denfendants' agents, that the situation was dan-
gerous, would be adequate to show awareness of risk-
~lthough the comment holds further, that knowledge of 
danger is not required to be proved, it is enough to show 
4 
th;\t th(' ador knows of tht> high degree' of risk and 
tli;1t ot!H'J'S ma~· lw t'X)lOSC'd. 
Tlw ~n1n·ernP Court of 1-tah has not had occasion 
ti l'~arninP this section in lig-M of thP facts herein, but 
it has quokd S('etion 500 with apprnval in Wood v. 
[1111/or. 8 Utah 2d 210, 332, P2d 215; Ferguson v. 
J() 11 q . .:.man, 10 l~tah 2d 179, 350, P2d 404; and State v. 
U('rclitord, 11 Utah 2d 208, 357, P2d 183. 
fn Greeian c. Soloman, \.Vash. 1955, 47 Wash. 2d 
;;;).J., 287 P2d 721, the plaintiff fell in an excavation 
il1lg hy clef<0 ndant's agents in an unlit and unguarded 
;1rPa ·whPn cl(cfrnclant was found to have known that it 
>!wn!d lHLY<' known pE~oplc wonld walk at the time, the 
ilninti ff, a knant, was in the bark yard for the purpose 
,1f deliwring refuse in a garLage can. The Supreme 
C'nn:·t adopted the Rtstate1aent rule as set out in Sec-
rinn :1PO and found that the above facts constituted wan-
tn~1 mit:conduct. 
Two ~·ears latPr tlw Supreme Court of Arizona, in 
Busy Bee Buffet v. Farrell, 82 Ariz. 192, 310 P2d 817, 
fnnnd the defendants were guilty of gross and ·wilful 
rn!:::('onduct \vhen they had a trav door which extended 
th<· width of a passag<";:::-::: and did not have adequate 
i~nard rails or \rnrnings. It is said that such a situation 
«n•ated a potential danger at all times and an actual 
danger \dwn open and unguarded. 
( )rpgon and California have both recognized that 
the::.;p fact:-: constitute the maintenance of a dangerous 
eondition. See Senner v. Danewolf, Ore. 6 P2d 240, 
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and Chance i;, Lawry's, lnc., 24 Cal. RP11R 209 ·)-, 
'0/-t 
P2d 185. 
The landlord removpd a railing from a vorz :1 froi:: 
which a guest fell-in Rossiter 'i·. Moore, \Ya::-;;:., 37
1 
P.2d 250. The trial court granted a directed verdict 
in favor of the landlord and defendant. This \ms i·t .. 
versed by the Supreme Court which followed Grc~etan 
e. Soloman, supra, but which identified the acts not onh 
as wanton misconduct as in Greetan v. Soloman, but 
held that these acts constituted a nuisance, saying: 
There is a wide distinction between act::-; lawful 
in themselves, done by one upon his own premisP~. 
which may result in injury to another if not prop-
erly done or guarded, and those which in thi 
nature of things must so result. In the fornH'J 
case a party could only be made liable for actual 
negligence in the performance of the act or modt~ 
of maintaining it, while in the later case, h1 
would be liable for all the consequences of hi.-
acts, whether guilty of negligence or not. Thi, 
one act only becomes a nuisance by reason of the 
negligent manner by which it is performed or 
maintained, while the other is a nuisance iwr s1'. 
Woods La\v of Nuisances, 2d Ed., 141. 
In the instant case, it is admitted that 
the landlord had full knowledge of the 
condition of the premises at the time of 
leasing. 
This is in accord with our decisions: Greetan 
v. Solomon, 47 vVash. 2d 354, 287 P.2d. 721; l\k 
Courtie v. Bayton, 159 \Vash. 418, 29-l P. 238. 
Cf. Marks v. Nimbil Realty Co., 2-1-5 N.Y. 256. 
157 N.E. 129. 
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Thn." tlw Conrt Jwld that \\·ilful misecrnket an<l nn~­
<lllC'<' 1n>I'<' in )pgal <>r-i'<'d th1• outgrowth of fop sarnP 
1wt' and in lt>gal effrct at least, so far as these facts go, 
;<l('nti<·al. 
Long lwfore tht- Restatement of Torts, the Supreme 
( 'onrt of etah earnr: to tlw samP conelnsion. Jn Lar::;.on 
, . ('nlrler's Park Company, 45 U. 325 180 P. 599, the plain-
tiff. ag<· eleven, lost the sight of an eye when he was hit 
Ji, a hullet from a shooting gallery on premises owned by 
tb· dPfond~u1t. The facts indicah•d that tlw defondant 
b("\' the pn·rnises were to be so used and knew that 
t lw \\alls of the gallery had holes, cracks and openings 
111 it that would not stop a bnllet, and finally that the 
,];.fp•1dant kne\Y that the path on which the paintiff 
'·" <t:-i walking was in fact used by the public and visitors 
'<1 the Park. The Court, speaking through Justice vVeber, 
t'<:1~nd that the defendant had maintained a dangerous 
c11nrlition and a nuisance and that the defendant was 
~nhjecting the public to danger unless the gallery was 
tr·paired and the walls \Vere protected. The judgment 
fnr the plaintiff was sustained. 
The defendants herein were guilty of wilful and 
wanton misconduct and that they maintained a danger-
ous condition that constituted a nuisance. The facts sup-
J!'ll't a cause of action based upon either the requested 
Llllt<~ndment or on the theory of nuisance, the legal effect 
lieing the same. 
POINT IL 
11HE 1IOTION" TO A~IEND WAS TIMELY 
AKD PF_:Ri\IJTTED BY THE UTAH RULES 
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE. 
7 
Ruk·s 15(a), (b), n:1d Li cl tlw Utah Ilnlt·~ oi' ('jy;I 
Procedure mm;t be examined in order to determine if 
the trial court abused its discrdion in refusing to allu\\ 
the phi.intiff to amend his pleadings. Rule Hi 11n,,- 1 d,~ 
that the court may direct a pretrial hearing for tlL· pur-
lJOSe of simplifying the iswes and the handling of otht·i 
matters which will aid in the disposition of the adion 
being tried. The order issued by the court fro1a th;~ 
hearing lim;ts the trial to issues " ... not dislJO."Pd ot 
by the admissions and agreements of couns0l; an<l su('L 
order when entPred controls tlH~ s::h0 cql.1ent courst· of 
the action, unless modified at the trial to prevent mani-
fest injustice." Since no procedure for modifying t!11· 
pretrial order "to prevent mani.fest injustice" is sprr-'1-
fied in this section, it seems evident that Rule 15 whil'h 
specifically provides for amended and supplemental 
pleadings should be the rule to control any anwndmen: 
to a pretrial order. It is difficult to undersb.nd ho'" 
Rules 15(a) and (b), which allo1-v amendments durin:! 
a trial, could be of any practical value unless they \YPr~· 
intended not only to allow amendments to th2 pleading~ 
but also to any pretrial order that might be involved. 
The court in Reich v. Christopidos 123 Vt. 137, 256 P.~d 
238, 241 (1953) pointed this out when it said, "Rulf 
15(b) U.R.C.P. provides for: ' ... amendment of th~ 
pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to conforlll 
to the evidence ... even after judgment ... ' and Rul~ 
16 provides that the pretrial order may be ' ... modified 
at the trial to prevent manifest injustice.' It would be 
anomalous if the pleadings could be so amended but 
the pretrial order could not." 
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Tlll' sedion of Rule 15(a) which applit•s to thi::-; ease 
i;-; thP ::;edion that says, "Otherwise a party may amend 
'ii~ i1kadings only by leave of eourt or by written con-
>(•nt of tlw adverse party; and leave ::-;hall be freely 
.::iwn "·hen justiC'e so requires." Rule 15(b) is but an 
( nlnrgement of this clause. The court recognized this 
11 1 ((o!'ltz L'. Coutincntal Bank and Trust Company 5 
l't. :2d :20-1-, 299 P.2d 832, 835 (195G) where it said that 
Htd(• 15(h) emphasized situations coming within the last 
1,11·oyisinn of 15(a). Rules 15(a) and (b) can be con-
~1d1•l'(•d a::-; a single rule in determining the spirit in 
'\Ii id1 the;,· are to be applied. Rules 1 (a), 8 ( f), and 
:,.+ (('l\ll when considered in connection with rules 15(a) 
anl1 (h) indicate that rules 15(a) and (h) should be 
.1i1plied liberally. In Jackson v. Cope 1 U.2d 330, 26G 
1i_:.:d 300, 503 (1954) the court in talking about amend-
11wnts to pleadings, cited with approval the following 
:-tatrntent, " ... Amendments should be liberally allowe<l 
in the interest of justice whenever it will aid in settling 
an Pntire controversy. The limitatons thereon should be 
\\·!'.ether the matters involved are such as can be con-
nniPnt1y and effectively handled i.n one trial without 
injm)· to substantive rights. . . ." The Federal court 
has made similar statements in construing rules 15(a) 
;end (lJ) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which 
<1 rP substantially the same as Utah's rules. In Lloyd 
'. l'nited Liqnors Corp. 203 F.2d 789, 793 (6 Cir. 1953) 
qt<' ('Ourt said, "Rule 15(a) ... provides that leave to 
Ji i(' nmendmt>nts to pleadings 'shall be freely given when 
justice ."O requires.' Rule 15(b) further evidences that 
1 mrpos<' of the rule makers to have been that material 
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m:1t>nch1u•nts shall lw f·.,' 1.1· c-''.(J\\'< d to aecopq 1 Ji~Ji thi 
pn•sentation of an action on its nwrits .... Th<> tPnd.Pn(·\ 
of tlw federal courts have heen consistently towar;l 
greah•r lilwrality in the allmrnnce of amL1rnL (' .: 
pleadings .... '' Similar statements were made in Pick. 
ford Corp. v. De Luxe Laboratories 1G9 F. Supp. 11~. 
120 (Cal. D.C. 1958) and Stafford v. Roacltcay Turns.I 
Co. 70 F. Supp. 555, 5G5 (Penn. D.C. 19-17). 11 hc· court 
in Staf(ord S((Jd, "Amrndments should be allowed with 
great liberality at any stage of the case ... oth<1 nrisi· 
justice would be defeated through a mere mistake as to 
the form or title of the action." 
Rule 15 (b) consists of two sections. The first con-
cerns the treatment of issues which are tried by implied 
or expressed consent of the other party and the second 
concerns the allowance of amendments when the other 
party obpects to evidence which is being presented. ThiE 
last section does not apply to this case since the defend-
ant did not object to the introduction of the evidence 
given rise to the proposed amendment. However, thi~ 
section does point out the conditions under which the 
court should in justice allow an amendment. 
There have been cases in ·which the court has allmreJ 
amendments by implied consent under circumstance~ 
similar to those at issue herein. In Draper v. J. B. & R. E 
TValkcr, Inc.J 121 Ut. 567, 244 P.2d 360 (1952) the court 
ruled on evidence concerning a right-of-way ew:1 thougb 
the pleadings were based on the issue of nuisance, did 
not refer to the right-of-way, and were not amended tL' 
bring the issue up. In ElPaso Electric Co. v. Su.rrency. 
10 
l!;!J V~d -P-1 ( 10 Cir. 1;q~) the dd'endant was clrnrged 
.- 1th 01wwting- a dPfodive truek on th!:' road. During 
· !1·.· trial <'\.· dPm·e \ms intrnducPd which t-stablished that 
:.11!' 1kfrndant's cm11loye1's operated the truck with knowl-
,•11;.;(· o!' its condition, and so the conrt held that the 
.~:-:rn" which was produced by tlw d<>fendant, was con-
:-:1·ntPtl to by tlH• df'fendant, and the conrt instructed the 
j\11·:· on tltP i:-:sl~<'. Tn Curro? r. Ilorrison, .+9 F. Supp. 
~'-::; (Y<1. D.C. 19.+3) the plaintiff brought an action 
:1[!,·:w1st th<' defrndant for his negligence which rC'sulted 
l' ;1 1lPath fr'.lrn an automobile accident. The court found 
1 liat tlw def1•rnlant had been negligent in allowing an 
nu:1•nt to drive a cai· while under the influence of liquor. 
'i.l:" plaintiff had not alleged this theory of negligence 
!11;t thl' «omt held that since the defendant had not 
(1li,1Pl'k(l to the evidence being introduced, the court under 
rn]1• l:J(h) could rule on the evidence. June T. Inc. v. 
i\.•11.11, 290 F.2d -1-04 (5 Cir. 19Gl) concerned a negligence 
m·t:on hrougbt on the grounds that a ship was unsea-
\\'l)rthy because of defective parts and equipment. Dur-
;ng- tht> trial the cvidPnce showed that three men were 
nPPCTf'd to run the ship and so the court ruled that the 
elf.fondant was negligent because he only provided a 
t\\·o-rnan crew. The com·t assumed implied consent to 
miw!1d the complaint. In Hall v. Nation.a,[ Supply Co., 
:.!/() F.2d 379 ( 5 Cir. 1959) an action of negligence was 
])]'(rnght against the driver of a car which was in an 
Hl·ei<lt>nt. During the trial, evidence came out to the 
( t'f\•et that tlw defendant had been drinking. The court 
:-:aid this issue was tried by implied consent and there-
\'orp allowed an amendment. In the Stafford v. Roadway 
11 
Tra11sit Co., supra, the court took notice of PvidPnC:l' tliat 
a truck driver was negligent in operating a truek PYell 
thongh the plaintiff's adion Was based On nno·L,ri
1 '-r ,_,, ](·,. 
which occurred while the truck was not in mof ')TI Tl 
" • It• 
plaintiff did not ask for an amendment, so the (·ouri 
must have ruled on the issue because of implied consPnt. 
The above cases indicate that the court should find, 
in the instant case, that the issue of wilful misC'onduet 
was raisPd and that the defendant impliedly conscntt•d tu 
it being made an issue. It is possible that the defendant 
realized that no new issue was Leing raised, and did 
not object because he did not want to bring the plaintiff\ 
attention to it, or because he did not want the plaintiff 
to seek an amendment under the second part of Ruh 
15(b). \~Yhile this possibility is remote, it is something 
that should be considered in determining if the defendant 
impliedly consented to the evidence introduced. 
Even if the defendant did not impliedly con8ent to 
the introduction of a new issue, the spirit of rules 15(al 
and (h) would indicate that the plaintiff still should 
he able to amend his complaint. As has already been 
pointed out, the courts have held that rules 15(a) and 
(b) are to be liberally construed to allow amendments. 
The Utah court has said that an amendment should be 
allowed as long as the defendant is not prejudiced in 
presenting his defense or his substantive rights in some 
other way injured. Jackson v. Cope, supra, p. 503; Keller 
r. Gerber, 114 Utah 345, 199 P.2d 562, 565 (1948), Gra-
lwrn 1'. Street, 109 Utah 460, 166 P.2d 52-±, 527 (19±6): 
Hartford Accident and Indeniinity Co. v. Clegg, 103 
12 
i·tuh -tl-L l:l;J P.2d 919, 92:3 (1943); Wells v. Wells, 2 
1 ·.~d :2-+:2, :27:2 l'.:2d 167, 170 (1954). The ~"'eferal Courts 
''""" ;d,.:o held that an amendment to the pleadings 
:--hm:ld hP allmn·d as long as it does not work an injustice 
'o t}w dPfendant. Stafford v. Roadirny Transit Co., 
:;npra, p. 5G5, Fli-Fab, Inc. v. United States, 16 F.R.D. 
,) ... i:j, :>56 (R.I.D.C. 1954). 
Th<' df•fendant C'annot claim injustice just because 
11<· i:-: n•quired to face an issue which he would rather 
~LYoid. In Scott v. Baltimore and 0.R. Co., 151 F.2d 61, 
1;.~ (:)rd Cir. 1945) the dPfendant was charged with negli-
i~Pnre undPr the> Federal Employees Liability Act and 
the Safety Appliance Act. The court took notice of 
tlw Boiler Inspection Act and charged the jury thereon. 
The court said, "We may assume, arguendo, that the 
plaintiff started his action on one theory which his 
proof did not support. Then the proof, we may assume, 
sustained recovery on another ground. It is true that 
tlw pleadings could then be amended to conform to the 
proof, but obviously this would mean no satisfaction to 
tllP defendant. The only injustice to the defendant in 
such a situation is when he is compelled to go on with 
thP trial and meet a new point which is a surprise to 
him and on which he has had no opportunity to prepare." 
The plaintiff should have been allowed to introduce 
Uw issue of wilful and wanton misconduct. The plain-
tiff's motion to amend the pleadings was made at the 
Pn<l of his presentation of evidence and before the de-
frndant had in any way committed himself. If the de-
f(·ndant wa:::; surprised by the new issue and needed more 
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t;nw to prPpm·p a clPf<.1::<~\ \;li:c'h i:; not lik(•[y :"inc·<· 111 • 1 1 
same \\·i tn Ps:sps and clevidence would have been depended 
npon Ji:.· the defendant, then he should have requPstr(l a 
continuance' to allow hi1d to prepan~ a proper d1·; . 11 ~, 
ThPrPfore, thP defo11dant would not have been ~1n'Jli 
ditPd r1.\· the prnposc~d amendment. 
The com·ts ;u sollH' cases haYP held thD.t an alli~·nd-
111ent to the pleadings 11rnst not introduce a new cau~e 
c1f arr en. (" tnh C;;nrts have l'('('.0[1;n ;'.·~('d t}!is rnk In 
If art.ford Acri,cle11i und Iudenrnify Co. r. Clcg[!, supra, 
a ca~w v;hid1 occurred hv1o~e the p1esent Ctr-Ji Euh·~ ol 
Civil Procedure -.,,·e1·e ado1Jted, the court allowPd th 
pla:11tiff to a11wnd his plead:ngs after all thr evidern·1• 
had bet•n suh111itkcl. The plaintiff had based his aeLio11 
nn a $:?0,000 bo:1d agree11wnt but then sought to amend 
his pleacl;ngs so that he could base his action on a $10,000 
hond agreement. The court recognized that an entirely 
new cause of action could not be introducPd hut ~a 11 
that this only meant that the defendant could not b~ 
:c~]-:(•d to faee a whole different and distinct legal ohl:µ-n-
tion. In this case the facts needed to show the hrea('h 
of one contract ,,·ere thP io.ame that were needed to sho11 
the breach of the other. The court said that a cause 
of action can give rise to innumerable rights and so they 
should Le considered in light of convenient, efficient 
trial worl~ ,,-hich would lead to a full hearing of tlw 
llH-'rits of the ontire controversy based on a "ompletl' 
;_tdjudieation of the facts and not the pleadings. In 
(~mhrrm r. 8trl'et, supra, p. 527, the court eitrd the 
1 lartford ea::-:e with approval and said that it lwld that 
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t lii·r(· \Yas no nl'W eaust- of action whp1·e thP npw matters 
on'·'· ". . . <'ll la rgP on tlw facts to J>rPsent a series of 
·. 1:rn~.aetions all gt>rmane and forming a conntich'd wholP 
rdkding the mannPr in which the plaintiff was injured . 
. . . " Tn Jackson 1'. Cope, supra, p. 50:1, a case decided 
;Jte>r the aecqitance of the Utah Rules of Civil Pro-
i·1·1lnre, tlw court said that the matter of amending a 
11\<·adinµ: would lw clearC'r if we omit entirely the tenn . . . 
"1.·amw of ~rtion." In lVclls v. lVells, supra, p. 170, the 
.. onrt in an aetion by the plaintiff to get alimony and 
:·lt:ld ~npport. which was denied, allowed the plaintiff 
tn a111t>nd at tht> end of the trial to collect past child 
o:npport. The court said the amendment was in a tech-
nieal sense a new cause of action but that it was not 
, '"·holly different cause of action or legal obligation 
~inc·1 :t \Yas the same legal obligation from the same 
l'an·nt to the same chid. The court said the amendment 
11·a~ in C"onformance with the evidence and was such that 
d C"ould be conveniently handled to settle the entire 
r·ont roversy without injuring the defendant's substantive 
rights. It seems clear from these cases that the Utah 
'.·ourt rralizes that the term "cause of action" has little 
rahw and that as long as a new issue arises out of the 
Hlllle factual situation and can be conveniently handled, 
it should be allowed by an amendment to the pleadings. 
The federal courts have also considered the introduc-
tion of a new cause of action by an amendment. In Lloyd 
1. United Liquor Corp., supra, p. 793, the court said, 
"ThP Supreme Court of the United States has fixed the 
linub of iwrmissible amendment with increasing liber-
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ality and has ruled that a ck111ge of the legal thron 
11
:· 
th•' adion is no long0r accepted as a test of the ~ro: 
priety of a proposed anwndment." In Vol. 3, Jloor'., 
Federal Practice ~ 15.13 (2) p. 98-1- the author ~:aid thnr 
''Rule 15 (b) has rejected any concept that such amen(l-
ments are barred if they result in a changp of the plain. 
tiff's 'cause of action' . . . The fact that this innJlw~ 
a change in the nature of the cause of action, or tlw legal 
theory of the action is immaterial so long as the oppo~­
iing party has not been prejudiced in presenting hi~ 
case." In Blair v. Durham, 13-1- F.'..?<l 729, 731 (Gth Cir. 
19-13) the court held that where the plaintiff alleg(•d 
negligence of the defendant's workmen in letting a piece 
of wood fall from a scaffold and strike the plaintiff. 
but then amended under 15 (a) during the trial of alleged 
negligent construction of the scaffold, the new theory of 
negligence did not introduce a new cause of adion lw-
cause " ... the cause of action alleged grows ont of tht· 
same transaction and is basically the same or is identical 
in the essential elements upon which the right to su" 
is based and upon which the defendant's duty to perform 
is alleged to have arisen." The court also said, ''A cause 
of action is the unlawful violation of a right or failurP 
to discharge a duty which the facts show." 
Here the alleged new theory grows out of the samr 
transaction and the same duty owed by the defendant. 
It could be conveniently handled in one trial without 
prejudice to the defendant, therefore, it is not a new 
''cause of action." 
The above examination of the lmv and cast>s dearly 
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,ho\\' that rules 15(a) and (b) as interpreted by the 
i·onrts should permit an amendment by the plaintiff. 
Tlw plaintiff made his motion at the end of his 
presentation of evidence and did not seek to introduce 
an:· 11e\Y evidence, the only interruption of the trial 
i.drich ('Ould havP n'sulted would have heen the granting 
of a eontinuance so that the defendant could prepare 
to meet the new issue. However, rule 15(b) recognizes 
this as a situation to be used in a case of this nature. 
'l'he rule, therefore, clearly indicates that the necessity 
of a continuance is not a ground upon which a motion 
to amend should be denied. 
Tlwre has been some specific language of the courts 
( uncerning the denial of an amendment because of a 
dela;.' in time. The court in Fli-Fab Inc. v. United States, 
supra, p. 556, in response to a motion to amend which 
was made before the trial said, "The primary question 
for the consideration of this court is whether the allow-
ance of the proposed amendment will work an injustice 
npon the plaintiff and the timeliness of the motion for 
]Pave to amend is one of the elements to be considered. 
However, in and of itself, delay is not enough to warrant 
tlw denial of such a motion. It must be shown that to 
allow the amendment will result in prejudice to the 
(lppositf' party." In Arm.strong Cork Co. v. Patterson-
Sargent Co., 10 F.R.D. 534 (Ohio D.C. 1950), the court 
in eonsidering the timeliness of a motion said, "Time 
of itself is not important. Other reasons must attach 
· · . " The court in Stafford v. Roadway Transit Co., 
::;urpa, p .. 565, said "Amendments should be allowed with 
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trreat liberality at am'} sta,,.e of the case " A · ·1 h . • n • . . • smu ar 
statement was made by the court in Blair v. Durham 
supra, p. 731, when it said, "Rule 15(a) ... providE; 
that a party may amend his pleadings by leavp of th" 
court, which leave shall be freely given when justiee ~ 11 
requires at any time during the proceedings . ... " 
Tlwre are a number of cases which indicate by their 
holdings that a delay in amending a complaint is n1,1 
a reason for denying an amendment. The following l'tah 
<'.Uses have so indicated. 
In Jackson i:. Cope, ::;upra, the court allov;ed th 
plair:tiff to ame11d his pleadings from tort to asswup8it 
after he rested his case. The court said this was allowed 
berause the amendment conformed to the evidene1>, it 
did not injure the plaintiff's substantive rights, and it 
was in the furtherance of justice. In J( eller i;. Gcrl!t'I 
supra, tlH• plaintiff moved to amend after he had pn~ 
on his evidence to allege ownership of a truck in a cla:n 1 
::md delivery action. The court allowed it. In Graham 1. 
St re et, supra, the court allowed the plaintiff during the 
trial to amend his pleadings from a charge of a n'f'aki 
trant partner to one of a defrauding partner. In Hart-
ford Accident and Inde1nnity Co. i-. Clegg, supra, thf 
court allowed the plaintiff to amend at the close of hi~ 
evidence to allege a different bond agreement that tht 
one he pleaded. And in Wells v. Tl' ells, supra, the court 
allowed the plaintiff to change her action at the end 
of the trial from one to secure alimony and child support 
tn one to collect past child support. 
The Federal Courts' holdings have been similar to 
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iLn:-w of tlw l:tah C'ourts. ln Great Atlantic and Pacific 
J, ,, Co. c. Jo11es, 177 F.2d 166, 167 (4th Cir. 1949) the 
plaintiff brought an action for negligence of her em-
plo~·t'r in hitting her with a truck. At the end of all 
1 ]i,, testimony she was allowed to amend to allege that 
~he ,,·as injured by a case which had fallen from the 
1nwk onto her. In Hall v. National Sitpply Co., supra, 
i·YidPnce that the defendant had been drinking before 
an accident occurred, came out during the trial. There-
J',1rt>, tlw court allowed the charge of negligence to be 
:nnPndecl to include that of driving while intoxicated 
ln ~'ru:man v. Zinn, 164 F.2d 558 (3rd Cir. 1947) the 
plaintiff brought an action for negligence against a doc 
tor for negligently performing an operation on the plain-
df\ foot. During the trial evidence came out which 
1.·:-tahlished that the negligence was in the doctor's diag-
nosis. The plaintiff sought to amend but the trial court 
11·ould not allow it and gave the defendant a non-suit at 
tlH' end of the plaintiff's evidence. The appellant court 
owrruled the trial court and said that the amendment 
:;hould have been allowed. In Pickford Corp. v. DeLuxe 
Laboratories, supra, the court allowed the defendant to 
amend at the end of his evidence to include a statute 
of limitations which had not been pleaded. 
These cases clearly show that the Utah courts, as 
wt-ll as the federal courts, feel that a motion to amend 
during a trial or even at the end of a trial, is timely 
a~ long as it does not injure the other party's substantive 
rights and it is in the furtherance of justice. Here the 
defendant's substantive rights would not have been m-
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jurt>d. The motion to arncnd should have been grant · ea. 
POINT III. 
THE AMENDMENT WAS ~IEHELY AN AJJ_ 
DITION TO A CA USE SET FORTH IN THB 
PRE-TRIAL ORDER. 
The pre-trial order provided: ''That the act:- (1t 
the defrndants, its agents and employees, in permittin~ 
an unguarded trap door to remain open created a nuis 
ance on thP defendant's premises." 
The faets herein clearly show that the plaintiff pr•1 
duced ample evidence that the jury could so find. Ro'-
siteer v. Moore, supra, Larsen v. Calder's Pork C1 .. 
supra. 
The legal duty of the defendant as crPated by ;: 
nuisance and the legal effect of wilful and wanton neg-Ji 
gence - misconduct is the same. They are set forth in 
plaintiff's requested but denied instructions. 
The facts, the duty and its responsibilities are identi-
C'al, and it is submitted all are includable under either 
the pre-trial order or the requested amendments. 
CONOLUSION 
The judgment and order of the trial court should 
he reversed. To do otherwise is to give the plaintiff 
less than full justice and is to afford the defendants a 
refuge to which they are not entitled. 
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TlH·n· c<lll li!' no ela;m of 1-lUrpnsP. Tlw k•gal de-
'"''" lhc'•'.'·,'-'<ll,\ for a (l('fomw to nuisan<'(' is identical 
11 
r J1o;;l' r(•q nire<l for wilful and wanton negligence. 
'JJ:,•:::• fad;; Y1t'n' at all times known to the defendants. 
r'.) lH'l'lllit tl1!;-; .~ndgrnl'nt to stand is to perpetrate injus-
, 1·1' rathf'r than to rPnder justice. 
Respectfully suhmitted, 
C. C. PATERSON 
Attorney for Appellant 
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